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Domestic Relations
Domestic Relations; paternity-blood tests
Evidence Code §895 (amended).
AB 123 (Stirling); STATS. 1981, Ch 266
Support: Attorney General; California District Attorney's Associa-
tion; Department of Social Services; National Organization for
Women
Opposition: American Civil Liberties Union; Western Center on
Law and Poverty
Existing law provides that when paternity is at issue in a civil action
the court must, upon motion of either party, order the mother, child,
and alleged father to submit to blood tests.' Historically, blood test
results were admissible into evidence only for the purpose of proving
non-paternity.2 This policy of excluding test evidence offered to affirm-
atively establish paternity was the result of judicial interpretation of
legislative intent.3 The Court of Appeal in Dodd v. Henkel noted that,
in adopting the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity,
the California Legislature omitted certain language that would have
permitted the introduction of the results of blood tests as affirmative
evidence of paternity.4 Therefore, the court reasoned, the Legislature
intended to provide for the use of blood test evidence only to disprove
the possibility of paternity.5
In recent decisions, however, California courts have taken judicial
notice of more advanced and significantly more accurate techniques for
blood testing, particularly the Human Leucocyte Antigen test (herein-
after referred to as HLA).6 The Court of Appeal in Cramer v. Morrison
noted that "the drafters of the Uniform Act did not have in mind tests
1. See CAL. EVID. CODE §892 (in addition, the court may order the tests sua sponte).
2. See, eg., Dodd v. Henkel, 84 Cal. App. 3d 604, 607-10, 148 Cal. Rptr. 780, 781-83 (1978);
Hodge v. Gould, 274 Cal. App. 2d 806, 808, 79 CaL Rptr. 245, 246 (1969). See generally B.
WrrKiN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE Blood Test for Non.Paternity §§657-660 (2d ed. 1966).
3. See 84 Cal. App. 3d at 609-10, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 782-83.
4. See id Compare 9 U.L.A. 110 (1957 ed.) with CAL. STATS. 1953, c. 1426, §1, at 3013
(originally codified as CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§1980.1-1980.7, now CAL. EVID. CODE §§890-897).
5. See 84 Cal. App. 3d at 609-10, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 782-83.
6. See Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 879-82, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865, 868-70 (1979).
See generally A.M.A. Committee on Transfusion and Transplantation with A.B.A. Section on
Family Law, Joint A.M4.-A.B_4. Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of
Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1976) [hereinafter cited as A.M.A.-A.B.A. Report].
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of the nature of the HLA' ' 7 and rejected precedent by ruling that blood
tests as reliable as the HLA test are admissible as evidence to affirma-
tively show paternity.'
Chapter 266 codifies the decision in Cramer by no longer limiting
blood tests to their probative value in establishing non-paternity.9
Chapter 266 provides that if the alleged father is exonerated by the
blood test results, the court, in its discretion, may submit the test results
to the jury for consideration along with the other evidence in the case;
for example, the fact of intercourse and the probable time of
conception.' 0
COMMENT
Chapter 266 represents a change in legislative policy resulting from
the availability of more accurate methods of blood testing. When Cali-
fornia originally adopted its version of the Uniform Act in 1953, the
Landsteiner series of red blood cell classifications (ABO, MN, Rh)'1
were the accepted standard tests used in California to determine the
possibility of paternity. 2 The probability of exonerating a wrongly ac-
cused man by the use of red blood cell classifications alone is poor;13 a
man who is not positively excluded from consideration on the basis of
red blood cell type is only one among a great number of the population
that could be the father. 4 On the other hand, the Human Leucocyte
Antigen test, which involves tissue typing of white blood cells, when
employed together with the standard red blood cell tests, increases the
probability of excluding non-fathers to above 90%.11
When blood test results are offered by a party as evidence establish-
ing the probability of paternity, Chapter 266 requires the court to
weigh the probative value of the test results against the likelihood that
their admission will create undue prejudice or confusion to the jury or
7. See 88 Cal. App. 3d at 880, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
8. Compareid at 882, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 870 with 84 Cal. App. 3d at 609-10, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
782-83.
9. Compare CAL. EVID. CODE §895 with CAL. STATs. 1953, c. 1426, §1, at 3013 (enacting
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1980.6).
10. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§352, 895.
11. See generally L. SussMAN, PATERNITY TESTING BY BLOOD GROUPING (2d ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as SussMAN].
12. See 88 Cal. App. 3d at 880-81, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
13. See SussMAN, supra note 11, at 8-9 (the chance of exclusion achievable by all red blood
cell tests combined is approximately 67%). See generally A.M.A.-A.B.A. Report, supra note 6, at
262 (probability calculations of 80% or less are not useful).
14. See SussMAsN, supra note 11, at 128; A.M.A.-A.B.A. Report, Supra note 6, at 262.
15. See Beautyman, Paternity Actions-A Matter of Opinion or a Trial of the Blood?, 4 J. OF
LEGAL MED., 17, 19 (Apr. 1976).
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undue consumption of time.'6 The court must then exercise its discre-
tion and either admit or exclude the evidence.17 Since blood test evi-
dence was inadmissible when only the Landsteiner test series was
available,' 8 it may be an abuse of discretion for the court to admit
blood test evidence to establish paternity when the HLA test or a test of
similar accuracy has not been performed. 9
16. See CAL. Evil. CODE §§352, 895.
17. See Id §§352, 895.
18. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
19. See generally Polesky & Krause, Blood Typing in Disputed Paternity Cases-Capabilities of
American Laboratories, 10 FAM. L.Q. 287, 291-92 (1976) (only 17% of American hospitals sur-
veyed were equipped to perform HLA testing).
Domestic Relations; legitimacy--motions for blood tests
Evidence Code §621 (amended).
AB 207 (Stirling); STATS. 1981, Ch 1180
Support: Department of Social Services
Under existing law, the child of a wife living with her husband is
conclusively presumed' to be a child of the marriage unless the hus-
band is impotent or sterile.2 If a court finds, however, that the conclu-
sions of all the experts, based upon blood test results, are that the
husband is not the father, the court may resolve the question of pater-
nity notwithstanding the presumption.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1180, a motion for an order in-
structing the parties to submit to blood tests could be raised by the
husband only.' Chapter 1180 authorizes the mother of the child to
raise the motion for blood tests if the child's biological father has filed
an affidavit with the court acknowledging paternity of the child.5 In
either case, the issue of paternity must be presented within two years
after the date of the child's birth.'
Chapter 1180 specifies that blood test evidence is applicable to rebut
the presumption that a child is a child of the mother's marriage only in
1. See 6 CAL. PRACTICE §44:5, at 185 (1980) (conclusive presumptions are irrebuttable by
any evidence).
2. CAL. EVID. CODE §621(a).
3. Id §621(b). See generally 13 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1981 CALIFORNIA LEGIS-
LATION 671 (1982).
4. CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1310, §1, at . See generally 12 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED
1980 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 369 (1981).
5. CAL. EvID. CODE §621(d).
6. See id §621(c), (d).
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cases that have not reached final judgment by September 30, 1980.7
Apparently, a mother bringing an action to dispute paternity8 who was
foreclosed from raising a motion for blood tests may have an unfavora-
ble judgment vacated, based on the provision in Chapter 1180 granting
standing to raise the motion, if the judgment was rendered subsequent
to September 30, 1980.9
7. See id §621(g).
8. See CAL. CIv. CODE §7006(a)(2) (giving the mother standing to bring an action disputing
paternity).
9. See CAL. EVID. CODE §621(g).
Domestic Relations; orders for support
Civil Code §4801.7 (amended); Code of Civil Procedure §674.5
(amended).
AB 1982 (Moorhead); STATS. 1981, Ch 822
Under prior law, if a party entitled to receive court-ordered spousal
support was a welfare recipient, the court was required to order the
support paid directly to the county clerk or other county officer.' In
addition, the district attorney was required to appear on behalf of the
welfare recipient in any proceeding required to enforce the order.2 In
all cases when the party is not a welfare recipient, existing law allows
the court, in its discretion, to still direct payment to be made to a
county officer 3 and to direct the district attorney to appear on behalf of
the recipient.4 Chapter 822 gives the court discretion to require pay-
ments to be made to a county officer in all cases, including cases where
the recipient is on welfare.5 When the court has ordered any support
payments to be paid directly to a county officer, the court may refer the
matter of enforcement to the district attorney,6 and the district attorney
may, at its discretion, bring any enforcement proceedings that it consid-
ers appropriate.7 Chapter 822 also provides that the district attorney
may enforce any order for spousal support whether or not there has
been a referral by the court." When the district attorney is required to
1. CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 866, §2, at - (adding CAL. CIv. CODE §4801.7).
2. Id; see 12 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1980 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 370, 375
(1981) (child and spousal support).
3. CAL. CIV. CODE §4801.7(a).
4. Id §4801.7(b).
5. Compare id §4801.7(a) with CAL. STAT. 1980, c. 866, §2, at
6. CAL. CIv. CODE §4801.7(b).
7. Id
8. Id
Padflc Law Journal Vol. 13
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bring an action to enforce payments of a child support order on behalf
of a welfare recipient, and the welfare recipient is also entitled to
spousal support payments that are in arrears, Chapter 822 requires the
district attorney also to enforce the spousal support order.9
Chapter 822 also provides that when the court orders spousal support
payments to be made directly to a county officer, the court may include
in the order a reasonable service charge.10 Where expenses of the
county or the district attorney exceed the applicable service charge,
these expenses will be a charge on the county where the proceedings
are pending."1
Under existing law, when a judgment for spousal support is recorded
with the county, the recording becomes a lien on all real property
owned by the judgment debtor (hereinafter referred to as debtor).12 In
addition, existing law specifies that when a debtor issues and records a
certificate, under penalty of perjury, that all payments that have ma-
tured have been fully paid and satisfied, the certificate will be prima
facie evidence conclusive in favor of any person dealing in good faith
and for valuable consideration with the debtor.13 Chapter 822 requires
that the certificate of the debtor, in order to be conclusive in favor of a
bona fide purchaser for value, must be accompanied by either (1) an
affidavit by the judgment creditor (hereinafter referred to as creditor),
signed under penalty of perjury, that all payments owed have been
fully satisfied,' 4 or (2) proof that a copy of the debtor's certificate, has
been served, at least ten days prior to recordation, on the creditor.'
5
The creditor must be served with a copy of the return receipt attached
to the certificate of service.16 Chapter 822 requires service on the credi-
tor to include a copy of the debtor's certificate and a notice 7 informing
the creditor that the debtor intends to record the certificate.' 8 The no-
tice must also inform the creditor that he or she has ten days to file an
affidavit of nonpayment to prevent the release of the lien, if the debtor
is not current in payments.19 The affidavit of nonpayment must declare
9. Id §4801.7(c).
10. Id. §4801.7(a); see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§276, 279 (to determine the applicable
service charge).
11. CAL. CIV. CODE §4801.7(d).
12. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §674.5(a). Seegenerall, Heller Properties, Inc. v. Rothschild,
11 Cal. App. 3d 705, 90 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1970).
13. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §674.5(b).
14. Id §674.5(c).
15. Id (service by personal service or certified mail).
16. Id
17. Id (example of the proper notice form).
18. Id
19. Id
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the matured accounts and installments which have not been paid by the
debtor, and must be signed under penalty of perjury.20 In order to pre-
vent the release of the lien and to nullify the recorded certificate of the
debtor, the affidavit of nonpayment must be recorded within ten days
of the service of the unexecuted certificate of the debtor on the credi-
tor.2' Any creditor affidavit recorded more than ten days after service
will be without force and effect.2 2 Chapter 822 also establishes that, if a
creditor knowingly records a false affidavit of nonpayment, the creditor
will be liable to the debtor for all damages caused by the false affidavit,
and any reasonable attorney's fees.23
Under existing law, when the court orders child or spousal support
payments made directly to a county officer, the debtor's certificate of
payment will not remove the property lien unless it is approved in writ-
ing by the designated officer.24 Chapter 822 provides that when ap-
proval of the county officer is needed to release the lien, the judgment
debtor's certificate does not have to be accompanied by a certificate of






24. Id §674.5(d); see CAL. CIV. CODE §4702.
25. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §674.5(d).
Domestic Relations; vocational training examination
Civil Code §4801 (amended).
AB 2135 (Konnyu); STATS. 1981, Ch 514
Support: California State Bar Family Laws Section
When awarding support in an action for the dissolution of marriage,
the court must consider certain circumstances including the ability of
the supported spouse to engage in gainful employment.1 In order to
determine the spouse's ability to obtain employment,2 Chapter 514 au-
thorizes the court to order that the party seeking support submit to an
I. See CAL. CIV. CODE §4801(a)(5).
2. See id §4801(a)(1), (5), (6), (f) (a vocational training consultant should have the knowl-
edge necessary to determine the earning capacity of the spouse, the ability of the supported spouse
to engage in gainful employment, and the time required for the supported spouse to acquire ap-
propriate education).
Pacfc Law Journal Vol 13
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examination by a vocational training consultant.3 The order, however,
may be made only on motion for good cause shown,4 and notice to all
parties, must specify the time, place, manner, and scope of the exami-
nation and the name of the examiner.' Furthermore, Chapter 514 pro-
vides that a person who refuses to comply with the examination order
will be subject to the same consequences as a person who fails to com-
ply with an order for a physical or mental examination. 6 These conse-
quences include taking the matters of which questions were asked as
established, prohibiting the noncomplying party from introducing evi-
dence, striking the noncomplying party's pleadings, or rendering a de-
fault judgment.'
3. Id §4801(e), (f) (vocational training consultant means an individual with sufficient
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education relating to interviewing, testing and analyzing
work skills, planning courses of training and study, formulating career goals, and analyzing the
work market to qualify as an expert in vocational training under California Evidence Code Sec-
tion 720).
4. See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2036 (showing of good cause).
5. CAL. CiV. CODE §4801(e).
6. See id See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2032(b)(1) (consequences for failure to
comply with order for physical or mental examination).
7. See CAL. CIV. PRoC. CODE §2034(b).
Domestic Relations; temporary restraining orders
Code of Civil Procedure §§527, 527.6, 546, 553 (amended); Penal
Code §273.6 (amended).
AB 293 (Thurman); STATS. 1981, Ch 182
Support: California State Bar; Los Angeles City Attorney
Prior law required a temporary restraining order or preliminary in-
junction issued exparte under the Family Law Act' or the Domestic
Violence Prevention Act2 to be made returnable for a show cause hear-
ing3 on the earliest day the business of the court would allow, but not
later than fifteen, or if good cause is shown, twenty days from the date
of the order.4 Chapter 182 extends by five days the duration of a tem-
porary restraining order or preliminary injunction issued under either
of the above acts, requiring the order to be returnable not later than
1. See CAL. CIV. CODE §4359.
2. See CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE §546.
3. See CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE
TRIAL §15.39 (1977).
4. See CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1158, §7, at - (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §546). See
generally 2 B. WrrIKiN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE ProvisionalRemedies §§46, 47, 83, 84,85 (2d ed.
1970).
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twenty days, or if good cause is shown, twenty-five days from the date
of the order.'
Under prior law, the court had the discretion to appoint counsel or
the district attorney to represent the plaintiff in a proceeding to enforce
an injunction or a temporary restraining order issued under the Family
Law Act.' Chapter 182 deletes the authorization for court appointment
of the district attorney.7 Chapter 182, however, charges the prosecuting
agency8 of each county with the primary responsibility for enforcing
injunctions and temporary restraining orders issued under certain sec-
tions of the Family Law Act9 and the Uniform Parentage Act.10
5. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§527, 546.
6. See CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 795, §10, at 2704 (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §553).
7. Compare CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §553 with CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 795, §10, at 2713.
8. See conversation with Lonnie Gordon, District Attorney's office, Los Angeles, California.
(The prosecuting agency may vary from county to county. In most cases it is the district attorney's
office; but in Los Angeles, for example, the prosecuting agency is the city attorney's office.) (copy
on file at the Pacfc Law Journal).
9. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§4359, 4458, 4516; CAL. PENAL CODE §273.6(3)(b).
10. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§7020, 7021.
Domestic Relations; dissolution of marriage
Civil Code §4800.6 (repealed and new); §§4370, 4811 (amended).
SB 1199 (Marks); STATS. 1981 Ch 715
The Family Law Act details procedures for the dissolution of mar-
riage.' Chapter 715 revises sections of the Family Law Act (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) regarding attorney's fees, combined child sup-
port, and notice of community property liability.2
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 715 the authority of a court to
order payment of attorney's fees or costs resulting from a proceeding
under the Act was limited to the husband or wife or parents of the
parties to the proceeding? Chapter 715 permits the court to order any
party to the proceeding, except a governmental entity, to pay whatever
amount may be necessary for the cost of maintaining or defending the
proceeding and for attorney's fees on issues relating to that party.4
Chapter 715 apparently was enacted to prevent any benefit to the party
1. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§000-5174.
2. See generally id
3. See CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 1030, §2, at 3547 (amending CAL. CiV. CODE §4370). See also In
re Marriage of Reyes, 97 Cal. App. 3d 876, 159 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1979).
4. See CAL. CIV. CODE §4370(a). See generally ATTORNEY'S FEE, TEMPORARY AWARD IN
FAMIY LAW ACTIONS, 1980 CONFERENCE OF DELEGATES OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
Resolution 1-9-80.
1-1 Pacft Law Journal Vol 13
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better able to afford lengthy litigation.5 For example, existing law pro-
vides for the joinder of employee pension plans as parties to proceed-
ings under the Act.6 Existing law, however, does not authorize the
court to order the pension plan to pay costs or fees for litigating issues
with which it is concerned.7 By allowing the court to order any party to
the proceeding to pay costs or fees, Chapter 715 eliminates possible
inequities under prior law where efforts to join a pension plan may
have been frustrated by lack of statutory authority to order payment of
attorney's fees and costs.8
Prior law provided that a superior court could order the parties to a
proceeding under the Act to pay reasonable costs and attorney's fees
during the pendency of the proceeding 9 and could augment or modify
the original award for costs and attorney's fees before the entry ofjudg-
ment.10 Prior law has been strictly construed by a California appellate
court to authorize payment, modification, or augmentation of fees and
costs to apply only to pending proceedings and to preclude action upon
a motion for fees or costs filed after the appeal has become final."
Chapter 715 expressly extends the court's authority to award costs and
attorney's fees on motions made after an appeal has become final.' 2
Existing law provides that a contract obligation assigned to one party
as part of the division of community property might be the basis of a
cause of action by a creditor against the other party if the assignee de-
faults on the obligation.' 3 Prior to the enactment of Chapter 715, an
attorney representing a marital party in an action for dissolution or
legal separation was required to give written notice to the client of the
client's liability.' Chapter 715 requires this notice to appear on the
face of the interlocutory judgment of dissolution or the final judgment
of legal separation,' 5 thus protecting clients from counsel who neglect
to give clients proper notice and making compliance with the notice
requirement more convenient and less expensive for attorneys.' 6
5. See 97 Cal. App. 3d at 879, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
6. See CAL. CIV. CODE §4363.1.
7. See id
8. See id §4370(a). See also 97 Cal. App. 3d 876, 159 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1979).
9. See CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 1030, §2, at 3547.
10. See id
11. See In re Marriage of Kasper, 117 Cal. App. 3d 118, 172 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1981).
12. See CAL. CIV. CODE §4370(a).
13. See id §4800.6.
14. See CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 329, §1, at - (enacting CAL. CIv. CODE §4800.6).
15. See CAL. CIV. CODE §4800.6.
16. See notes of conversation with Josh Pane, Senator Marks' office, Sept. 30, 1981 (conversa-
tion regarding intent of the legislation) (copy on file at the Pacfc Law Journal).
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Finally, prior to the enactment of Chapter 715 courts were required
to separate child and spousal support provisions from the other provi-
sions in a support agreement. 7 Chapter 715 codifies the United States
Supreme Court decision in Commissioner v. Lester18 that if both parties
agree, spousal support and child support may be combined in a single
payment as family support. 19 A Lester agreement allows the parties to
dictate the income tax results of periodic payments by specifying the
allocation between spousal and child support payments.20 Under Les-
ter, the full amount is treated as spousal support and may be entirely
deducted by the payer and taxed to the recipient. 2' However, the
payer's advantage in deducting the combined amount for child and
spousal support should be weighed against the possible loss of depen-
dency exemptions for the children.22 The recipient's expenditures for
child support are considered contributions from the recipient even
though they come out of the family support payment.23 A parent's eli-
gibility for taking child exemptions largely depends on that parent's
contribution in support of the children. 4 If the recipient of the family
support contributes more child support than the payer, then the recipi-
ent will be entitled to the child exemptions.2 Chapter 715 also speci-
fies that the underpayment of any amount due as family support must
first be used to satisfy the child support portion of the agreement.2 1
17. See CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1545, §4, at 3140 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE §4811).
18. See Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 306 (1961).
19. See id See generally Support Agreements, Court not Obligated to Make Separate Child
Support Order Where 'ester Agreement" Combines Spousal and Child Support, 1980 CONFER-
ENCE OF DELEGATES OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Resolution 1-7-80; Family Support, 1979
CONFERENCE OF DELEGATES OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Resolution 2-12-79.
20. See CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA MARITAL TERMINATION SET-
TLEMENTS §5.19 (1971).
21. See 366 U.S. 299 (1961).




25. See id §§5.36-5.38.
26. See CAL. CIv. CODE §4811(d).
Domestic Relations; summary dissolution of marriage
Civil Code §4550 (amended).
SB 406 (Sieroty); STATS. 1981, Ch 123
Support: State Bar of California
In 1978, a provision for the summary dissolution of marriage was
Pac!fic Law Journal Vol 13
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added to the Civil Code' to permit a simple, less expensive, non-adver-
sary dissolution and to reduce the congestion of courts.2 In order to be
eligible for a summary dissolution, certain conditions must be met.3
Under prior law, if either party held any interest in real property, the
couple could not qualify for summary dissolution.4 Chapter 123 now
permits couples to take advantage of the summary dissolution if their
only interest in real property is a residential leasehold occupied by ei-
ther party.' The leasehold, however, must not include an option to
purchase and must terminate within one year of the filing of the disso-
lution petition.6
1. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§4550-4556.
2. See 6 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Husband and JVfe §108A (8th ed.
Supp. 1980); STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1980 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 1-8b-80; 10 PAC. L.J.,
REVIEW OF SELECTED 1978 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 442, 443 (1979); Governor Edmund G.
Brown, Jr., Press Release, No. 264, Aug. 21, 1978.
3. See CAL. CIV. CODE §4550. (These conditions include, among other things, that there be
no children of the relationship; that the marriage be not more than five years in duration; that
there be no unpaid obligations in excess of $3,000; that the total fair market value of community
or separate assets must be less than $10,000; and that the parties must have executed an agreement
setting forth the division of assets and liabilities.).
4. CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 627, §1, at -.
5. CAL. CIV. CODE §4550. See generally STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1980 CONFERENCE
RESOLUTION 1-8b-80.
6. See CAL. Clv. CODE §4550.
Domestic Relations; confidential marriage licenses
Civil Code §4213.1 (new); §4213 (amended); Government Code
§§26840.1, 26840.8 (amended); Penal Code §360 (amended).
SB 659 (Ellis); STATS. 1981, Ch 872
Support: California State Bar, Family Law Section; Department of
Finance; Department of Health Services; Family Service Council of
California
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 872, all persons authorized to per-
form marriages were permitted to solemnize a marriage' without ob-
taining either a marriage license or a health certificate2 when two
unmarried adult persons, living together as husband and wife sought to
1. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§4205, 4205.1, 4205.5.
2. See id §4213. See generally id §§4000-5138 (California Family Law Act). See also Ol-
son, In Re Marriage of Carey: The End of the Putative-Meretricious Spouse Distinction in Califor-
nia, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 436, 436 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Olson]. The California Family
Law Act defines marriage as a personal relation arising out of a civil contract, and the consent of
the parties capable of making that contract is necessary. Consent alone will not constitute mar-
riage; it must be followed by the issuance of a license and solemnization as authorized by code.
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legitimize their relationship.3 The public policy behind the authority to
marry without a license was to encourage unmarried persons who had
been living together as man and wife to legitimize their relationship by
shielding the parties from the publicity of a marriage recorded in the
ordinary manner.4
Chapter 872 qualifies the authority to perform confidential marriages
by requiring that the parties personally appear before a county clerk, a
clerk of the court, a judge in chambers, or other person authorized to
administer oaths to obtain authorization- for the performance of a con-
fidential marriage ceremony unless either or both of the parties are in-
carcerated in prison or the county jail or confined to a health care
facility.6 This authorization must be in a form that requires the parties
to declare or affirm that they meet the conditions precedent to a confi-
dential marriage and must be presented to the person performing the
ceremony.7 In addition, Chapter 872 makes it a misdemeanor to per-
form a confidential marriage in the absence of this authorization."' Fur-
thermore, Chapter 872 expressly limits confidential marriages to an
unmarried man and an unmarried woman, not minors, who have been
living together as husband and wife.9
Upon performance of the ceremony, Chapter 872 requires the certifi-
cate of marriage to be filled out by the parties and authenticated by the
person who performed the ceremony.' 0 As under prior law, confiden-
tial marriage certificates must be filed by the person performing the
ceremony with the county clerk" to be available for public inspection
upon court order.'2 Chapter 872 also requires the person performing
the ceremony to furnish the parties who were married a copy of the
certificate and an application for a certified copy of the certificate. 13
Clerks now are required to file copies of the confidential certificates
3. See Olson, supra note 2, at 452.
4. 32 CAL. JUR. 3d Family Law §42 (1977).
5. CAL. CIV. CODE §4213(a) (the authorization and the certificate of marriage shall be incor-
porated into one document as prescribed by the Registrar of Vital Statistics).
6. See id §4213.1 (if either or both of the parties to be married is physically unable to
appear in person, an authorization for the performance of a marriage shall be issued to the person
performing the ceremony upon that person's presenting an affidavit to the county clerk signed by
the person and the prospective marrying parties explaining the reason for their inability tb
appear).
7. See id §4213(a).
8. See CAL. PENL CODE §360.
9. CAL. CIV. CODE §4213(a).
10. Id
11. CAL. PENAL CODE §360 (penalty for failure to file).
12. See CAL. CIV. CODE §4213(a) (the registrar may respond to an inquiry regarding the
existence of a marriage performed pursuant to this section, but may not disclose the date of the
marriage). Compare id with CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 676, §59, at - (amending CAL. CIV. CODE1
§4213). See also Olson, supra note 2, at 452.
13. CAL. Civ. CODE §4213(a).
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periodically with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics rather than re-
porting the number of certificates filed. 14
14. Id. Compare id with CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 676, §59, at - (amending CAL. CIV. CODE
§4213).
Domestic Relations; freedom from parental custody and control
Civil Code §§237.5, 239 (repealed and new); §§233, 234 (amended).
AB 344 (Thurman); STATS. 1981, Ch 810
Support: California Association of Adoption Agencies; California
State Bar
Existing law permits any interested person to petition a superior
court for an order declaring a minor free from the custody and control
of his or her parents.' Chapter 810 changes these procedures to include
an expanded report about the minor by the juvenile probation officer,2
new representation requirements for the minor at the hearing on the
petition,3 and an interview of the minor by the court if the minor is at
least ten years of age.4
Upon the filing of the petition to declare a minor free from parental
custody and control, a juvenile probation officer or the county depart-
ment designated to administer the public social services program is re-
quired to investigate and report to the court the circumstances of the
petition5 and any recommendations for the proper disposition of the
minor.6 Chapter 810 broadens the scope of the report to include the
following: (1) either a statement that the minor was informed of the
nature of the action to end parental custody and control or a statement
of the reasons why an explanation was not given;7 (2) the minor's feel-
ings and thoughts on the legal action;8 (3) the minor's attitude toward
his or her parents and any preference for living with a parent or par-
ents;9 and (4) a statement that the minor was informed of his or her
1. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§232, 233. See generally 6 B. WrmN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW Parent and Child §§11-112 (8th ed. 1974).
2. See CAL. CIv. CODE §233.
3. See id §237.5.
4. See id §234.
5. See id §232 (conditions which must be met for a petition to be filed).
6. Id §233.
7. Id §233(a) (an explanation is not necessary if the emotional or physical condition or age
of the minor would make the explanation impossible or harmful to the best interests of the minor).
8. Id §233(b).
9. Id §233(c).
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right to attend the hearing on the petition.' 0
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 810, the judge read the petition to
the parents at the hearing and could explain to the minor the effect of
granting the petition." On the request of the minor or the parents, the
judge was required to explain the nature of the proceeding, the proce-
dures of the court, the possible consequences of the action, and any
terms in the petition.' 2 In addition, the judge determined whether the
minor and the parents had been informed of their rights to be repre-
sented by counsel.'3 At the discretion of the court, counsel could be
appointed by the court for the minor.'4 Existing law requires the court
to appoint counsel for indigent parents unless waived. 5 Chapter 810
revises and clarifies these procedures regarding the minor.' 6 With the
enactment of Chapter 810, the court must consider whether the inter-
ests of the minor require protection by the appointment of counsel.' 7
The court must appoint counsel if necessary, although the same counsel
may not be appointed to represent both the minor and the minor's par-
ents.' 8 Chapter 810 also prohibits the minor's presence in court for the
appointment of counsel unless the minor requests to attend or the court
orders attendance.' 9
After the filing of the petition, existing law requires that a citation be
issued directing any person having the custody of the minor or with
whom the minor resides to appear with the minor at the time and place
stated in the citation.20 Under prior law, a minor under the age of
twelve did not have to appear except upon an order of the court after
necessity was shown.2' Chapter 810 excepts only minors under ten
years of age from the requirement of appearing absent a court order.22
In addition, in response to recent case law,23 Chapter 810 requires that
a minor who is at least ten years old be interviewed by the court in
chambers regarding the minor's feelings and thoughts concerning the
10. Id §233(d).
11. CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 246, §3, at 458 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE §237.5).
12. Id
13. Id
14. Id;seeln re Dunlap, 62 Cal. App. 3d 428, 438, 133 Cal. Rptr. 310, 315 (1976). ButseeIn
re Richard E., 21 Cal. 3d 349, 355, 579 P.2d 495, 499, 146 Cal. Rptr. 604, 608 (1978).
15. CAL. CIV. CODE §237.5(b).
16. Compare CAL. STATS. 1981, c. 810, §3, at - (repealing and adding CAL. CIV. CODE§237.5) with CAL. STATS. 1974, C. 246, §3, at 458 (amending CAL. CIv. CODE §237.5).
17. CAL. CIv. CODE §237.5(a).
18. Id §237.5(b).
19. Id §237.5(a).
20. See id §234.
21. CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 246, §2, at 458 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE §234).
22. CAL. Cw. CODE §234.
23. See In re Jake H., 106 Cal. App. 3d 257, 269, 165 Cal. Rptr. 646, 653 (1980).
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custody proceedings,24 the minor's parent or parents, 25 and the minor's
preference regarding custody.26 The interview may be waived only if
the minor is represented by counsel.2 7 The court also must inform the
minor of the right to attend the hearing on the petition.28
When the minor is declared by order or judgment of the court to be
free from the custody and control of both parents, existing law permits
the court to appoint a guardian of the minor.29 Chapter 810 provides
alternatives to appointing a guardian by authorizing the court to refer
the minor to a licensed adoption agency for adoption under certain
conditions30 or, if a petition for adoption is pending, to place the minor
or require the minor to remain in a foster home.3 ' After a referral to an
adoption agency, the adoption agency has custody and control of the
minor until the minor's adoption.32 A petition for guardianship may
not be filed without the consent of the adoption agency.33 Chapter 810
prohibits adoption of the minor until the appellate rights of the parents
have been exhausted.34
24. CAL. CIV. CODE §234(a).
25. Id §234(b).




30. Id §239(b) (the court may refer the minor to an adoption agency at the request of the
State Department of Social Services or to a licensed adoption agency if it is in the minor's best
interest).




Domestic Relations; adult adoptions
Civil Code §227p (amended).
AB 301 (Alquist); STATS. 1981, Ch 734
Support: Department of Social Services
Existing law permits any adult to petition a superior court for the
adoption of a younger adult.' Chapter 734 imposes the requirement
that the petition include (1) the length and nature of the relationship
between the petitioner and the proposed adoptee, (2) the degree of kin-
ship, (3) the reasons for the adoption and why the adoption would be
1. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§221, 227 p. See generally 6 B. WrruN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW Parent and Child §211 (8th ed. 1974); 32 CAL. JUR. 3d Family Law §79 (1977).
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in the best interests of the petitioner, the proposed adoptee, and the
public, (4) the names and addresses of any living parents or adult chil-
dren of the proposed adoptee, and (5) the name of any person previ-
ously adopted by the petitioner and the petitioner's spouse and the date
and place of that adoption.2
At the hearing on the petition for adoption, existing law requires the
court to determine from an examination of the parties or counsel of any
party not present that the adoption is in the best interests of the parties
and the public. For this determination, Chapter 734 allows the court
to consider all evidence, oral or written, specifically including evidence
that is not in conformity with the Evidence Code.' Chapter 734 pro-
hibits any person from adopting an unrelated adult within one year of
another adult adoption by that person or his or her spouse unless the
adult to be adopted is the sibling by birth of an adult previously
adopted or is disabled or physically handicapped.'
In addition, Chapter 734 provides that any adopted adult may fie a
petition 6 to terminate the relationship of parent and child after written
notification to the adoptive parent.' The court may order the adoption
agreement terminated without further notice if the adoptive parent
consents in writing.' Absent written consent of the adoptive parent, a
verified written response must be filed within thirty days of the mailing
of the notification to the adoptive parent.9 After the verified written
response is filed, the court may order an investigation of the circum-
stances underlying the petition by the county probation officer or the
State Department of Social Services.' 0 A court hearing on this petition
to terminate is required by Chapter 734." Finally, Chapter 734 pro-
vides that hearings on adult adoption or on termination of a parent-
child relationship may be open to the public at the discretion of the
court.
12
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